Beyond Classification:
Cicero's Eclectic Rhetorical Tradition



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"It was in the philosophical schools rather than in the rhetorical schools that some of the most important advances in rhetorical theory were made"
--George A. Kennedy (Classical 84).

Rhetoricians throughout history have, for the most part, been a particularly eclectic lot. One need only issue a cursory glance at influential rhetoricians in the modern academy to find theorists and critics such as Kenneth Burke, Edwin Black, Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Michael Osborn, David Bordwell, Herbert A. Wichelns, Janice Hocker Rushing, Michael Calvin McGee, Stephen Lucas, Michael Leff, and Karlyn Kohrs Campbell; these luminaries, to greater or lesser extents, listed in no particular order, are representative of our field, for they offer diverse backgrounds and disparate interests. From English and American studies to psychology and myth, from media studies to feminist politics, these scholars illustrate that rhetoric as a field of study, and the rhetor as an individual, are highly diversified, borrowers from many disciplines, and with allegiance to none. Modern philosophers such as Foucault, Habermas, Kant, Nietzsche, Derrida, Deleuze and Guattari inform their writings with new perspectives, as do the philosophies of intellectual movements such as modernism, feminism, structuralism, post-structuralism, Jungian and Freudian analysis. These modern-day rhetors have not left behind their classical founders--Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian--but rather have built upon their observations, and intertwined them with insights from cognate fields. Even these ancient rhetors are no exception to rhetoric's eclecticism, for in many ways they were as diversified as their modern counterparts.

It is my intention in this essay to trouble the way in which we look back at the classical orators. It is common to attempt to ascribe to them the lines of thought that led to their particular rhetorical theories. Why do we find this to be such a necessity, when we do not equally apply

such categorization to modern scholarship? To illustrate my point, I intend to look at the rhetoric of Cicero, and to examine the categories into which scholars have attempted to confine it. After tracking Cicero's rhetoric through the four main schools of rhetoric, and a few minor movements, I hope to show that it is resistant to such rigid categorization, that it is contradictory, shifting, inconsistent, unique and highly individualized--as is the rhetoric of all rhetors--beyond mere classification.

According to George A. Kennedy's *A New History of Classical Rhetoric*, Marcus Tullius Cicero was born in 106 B.C. at Arpinum, a city not far from Rome (117). His life spanned a period of great change, as the Roman Republic became the Roman Empire. Never truly a democracy, the republic was an oligarchy where the wealthy and influential determined the country's affairs (105). Speech was welcome concerning public issues, but without the force of the Greek democratic system. During his career, Cicero allied himself with the influential conservative class of the old system, and fought in the legal courts, and in public speeches for the reinstatement of the former republic. Primarily because of his prolific letter writing to family and friends, more is known about Cicero than any other person who lived during classical times (128). Some fifty-eight speeches, and miscellaneous writings on philosophy and rhetoric have survived (129). He is widely acclaimed as the greatest Roman orator and most important Latin writer on rhetoric (Kennedy, *Classical* 90). By exemplifying the culmination of classical rhetoric in his works, Cicero proves an interesting and important subject for this study.

The official philosophical schools extant, and still influential in Cicero's Roman culture, were largely those present in the earlier Hellenistic era. The four major schools were the Academic, Peripatetic, Stoic, and Epicurean. A brief explanation of the origin and philosophy of each seems necessary before examining how these schools are believed to have influenced Cicero's rhetoric. I will rely heavily on Kennedy's *Classical Rhetoric and Its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times* for information on the first two schools.

Plato, born in 429 B.C., founded his school at Athens. He started his Academy not long after his mentor, Socrates, was put to death, around 400 B.C. The followers of Plato's

philosophy became known as Academics. Much of Plato's energy went into developing treatises against contemporary Sophistic teachers of rhetoric such as Isocrates. Plato's writings *The Gorgias* and *The Phaedrus* deal directly with the ethical problems he sees posed by the unphilosophically grounded Sophists. By Cicero's time, the Academic school had slowly shifted in its interests, from Platonism to skepticism--a tendency to debate both sides of an issue (87).

Aristotle, born in 384 B.C., was himself a member of Plato's Academy. Although a great admirer of Plato, Aristotle had his own philosophy. Aristotle was rather pragmatic in his philosophical approach--he didn't share his mentor's mystical belief in a separate world of perfect forms. He started his own school, known as the Peripatetics, in 335 B.C. The school is named for the covered walkways (*peripatos*) which it occupied, and under which Aristotle would walk and teach (60). Much like the Academics, the Peripatetic school later developed in different philosophical paths than its founder originally intended. When Cicero refers to the Peripatetics, he is often referring to Aristotle, or his successor Theophrastus, rather than the weakened Peripatetic school of his day. Most later Peripatetic writers didn't even have knowledge of Aristotle's unpublished writings, including *On Rhetoric* (Kennedy, *New* 87).

Stoicism received its name from the painted colonnade (*stoa poikile*) of the ancient Athenian marketplace, where the school first met (Cicero, *Nature* xxxiii). Zeno, the founder of Stoicism, was born in 336 B.C., and studied under the Academics and Cynics. Zeno began teaching in 294 B.C., basing his philosophy on virtue and reasoning (Zeno 1). According to Zeno, man naturally craves the good--he wishes to be in harmony with nature (Colish 1:36).

Cato, a follower of Zeno, believed the passions of pleasure, pain, fear and desire "spring from erroneous intellectual judgments, judgments which depart from the cataleptic presentations to which men assent because of their intrinsic truth and conformity with reason" (Colish 1:136). According to Panaetius the Stoic, pleasure, pain, fear and desire lead to vices, "Even with bitter enemies, even when treated outrageously, we should maintain dignity and repress anger" (Kennedy, New 92). Yet certain emotions are good: "benevolence, mercy, sympathy and the

sober joys of friendship are good because they are rational passions . . . they replace the negative emotions with good ones" (Colish 1:42).

Another Stoic philosopher, Epictetus, believed that rhetoric should be avoided, as the common man could too readily be swayed by it, yet without good reason (Oates 238). He also took a strong stand against Epicurus: "Epicurus understands as well as we do that we are by nature social beings, but having once placed our good not in the spirit but in the husk which contains it he cannot say anything different" (Oates 263). Contrary to the Stoics' focus on the virtue of the spirit, the Epicureans focused on the transitory sensations of the body.

Robert Hicks in *Stoic and Epicurean* establishes that Epicurus, who was born in 341 B.C., had attended the Academy at Athens, and later founded his own Epicurean school in 307 B.C. (xv). Epicurus' philosophy was based on the necessity of fulfilling natural desires for personal happiness (Mitsis 51). His views were based on Atomism, a philosophy that saw the universe as composed of small particles. Epicurus states, "The whole of being, then, consists of bodies and space. The existence of bodies is everywhere attested by sense, and it is upon sensation that reason must rely when it attempts to infer the unknown from the known" (Hicks 220). He also viewed the human body as such; therefore, it possessed no soul. So, if there was no human soul to worry about after death, then there was no need to fear the gods. Epicurus looked for fulfillment through experience alone. Lucritius, a Latin writer and an Epicurean, later wrote *De rurum natura* or *On the Nature of Things* (Hicks 207). It stressed the material nature of the universe, the impotence of the gods, the sovereignty of man, and the goal of pleasure or tranquility. He emphasizes the laws of nature rather than divine intervention.

The stage is now set for a proper Burkean analysis, complete with Agent, Cicero; Scene, the Roman Republic's transformation into the Roman Empire in the mid-first century B.C.; Act, the speeches and writings of Cicero, primarily in the law courts; and Purpose, the salvation of the republic. Although a Burkean critique will not ensue here, it is worthwhile to see that the missing Pentadic link is Agency, and that the Agency here is the art of rhetoric--a tradition springing from the four philosophical schools just examined. The rhetorical critic is likely to

assume, then, that the Motive lies in the Agency, and extrapolate further with Burkean thought, that this demands a particularly philosophical yet pragmatic approach. Turning now to the examination of Cicero through the primary schools of thought, it should not prove difficult to follow a pragmatic philosophical approach, it will, however, be difficult to develop such an approach which is also consistent.

Cicero was much condemned in the ninteenth-century. According to G. P. Walsh, concerning Cicero's works, scholars "perused the treatises not so much to evaluate them for their intrinsic worth as to reconstruct the Greek sources on which Cicero naturally relied so heavily. . . ." They were in search of the Greek genius, as it had been manifested in art and literature, that so enthused them--the writings of the Romans were summarily dismissed for their own merits. Much was made of Cicero's own self-depreciating comment that "These writings are mere copies, produced with no heavy labor; I supply only the words, of which I have a rich store" (Cicero, *Nature* xi). Many well meaning scholars joined in the search for Cicero's philosophical origins, a partial list includes: Solmsen, Pahnke, Moraux, Guthrie, Volkman, Striller, Barwick, and Bringmann. Cicero, however, does not present himself easily to this task, for as I have mentioned, his is a rather eclectic approach. Yes, he relied heavily on the Greek philosophers and rhetoricians before him, but much of Cicero, himself, is present in his writings.

The following concern expressed by Marcia L. Colish in *The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages* about philosophical ideas in tension within Cicero's work is quite insightful, and is worth citing in its entirety:

> There are a number of methodological problems in this connection that need to be addressed. One of the thorniest is whether Cicero's frequent statements about his philosophical sources, concerns, and intentions can always be taken at face value. . . . [I]t would be ingenuous to accept these assertions uncritically. Despite his stated reliance on certain authorities, the works in which Cicero says he depends on often reveal his omission of apposite points made by these same authorities and his use of sources derived from alternative philosophical traditions, which he neglects to credit. It would be even more

> naive to accept Cicero's stated intentions on faith. Most of his philosophical works contain hidden agenda of one kind or another, whether personal or political or both. These features of Cicero's works have been noticed by many commentators and have led some of them to stress the propagandistic or self-serving character of his philosophical *oevre* as its main source of consistency. Other commentators, however, remain convinced of Cicero's basic sincerity and genuine public spirit. . . . Another difficult problem in the interpretation of Cicero's thought is his frequent inconsistency and inaccuracy in reporting philosophical ideas. It is certainly true that he expresses different opinions about the same subjects in different works, sometimes supporting a particular philosophical school in one work and attacking it in another. Since philosophical study was a life-long avocation for Cicero, it would seem unreasonable to charge him with the superficiality of an enthusiastic but misinformed latecomer to this discipline. (1:66)

Thus said, and before we begin to trace these "inconsistencies," let us first turn to Cicero's education.

Cicero was the first in his family to aspire to high political office. Colish states that "He received his early education in Rome, studying literature with the poet Archias and rhetorician Molo and philosophy with Phaedrus the Epicurean, Philo of Larissa of the New Academy, and Diodotus the Stoic." Later in 59 B.C. Cicero studied law with juriscounsults Quintus Mucius Scaevlola (1:61). Colish establishes that much later:

> During the years 79-77 B.C. Cicero interrupted his legal practice, leaving Rome because his recent and spirited defense of the controversial Sextus Roscius made it prudent to absent himself from the capital for a time. He made use of this opportunity to further his education in philosophy and rhetoric. In Athens he became the pupil of Antiochus of Ascalon of the Old Academy; then, traveling to Rhodes, he studied with Posidonius and with his earlier teacher Molo, later pursuing additional rhetorical studies in a number of eastern Mediterranean centers with Xenocles, Dionysius, and Menippus. (1:62)

This bears out Walsh's insight that Cicero was "an amateur philosopher of high culture and intelligence, for whom academic research and publication was always subordinated to political activity, but who returned with enthusiasm to his reading and writing when precluded from participation in affairs of state" (Cicero, *Nature* xi). On the same point, concerning this shift from public spokesman to philosopher, Cicero, himself responded:

> I see that there has been a wide and varying reaction to the several books which I have published within a short period. Some people have wondered at the reason for my sudden enthusiasm for the study of philosophy, and others have been eager to know what positive beliefs I held on each issue. . . .[M]y interest in philosophy is no sudden impulse, for I have devoted no little attention and enthusiasm to studying it , and I was philosophizing when I least appeared to be doing so. This is attested by my speeches, which are chock-full of philosophers' maxims and by my intimate contact with highly educated men, for my household was regularly honored by their presence. Then too I was educated by philosophers outstanding in their field, Diodutus and Philo, Antiochus and Posidonius. Moreover, if the injunctions of philosophy all have a bearing on how we live, I believe that in both public and private spheres I have put into practice the precepts recommended by reason and by learning. But if anyone wishes to know why I have come so late in setting these thoughts to paper, there is nothing which is easier for me to explain. I was at loose end with nothing to do, for the political situation demanded that the state be governed by the strategy and supervision of a single man. So my first thought was that I should explain philosophy to my fellow-citizens as a public duty, for I believed that the glory and reputation of the state would be greatly enhanced if such weighty and celebrated issues were discussed in Latin works as well as in Greek." (Cicero *Nature* 1.6-7)

This statement was coming from a man who had devoted himself to the preservation of the Roman Republic, and who was now in voluntary exile from Rome because the very dictator he had fought against, had now become Emperor. Cicero's thought concerning the workings and proper use of rhetoric had changed much throughout his lifetime from *De Inventione* written

when he was only a teenager (86 B.C.) to his mature treatise on oratory, *De Oratore,* written in 55 B.C. (Colish 1:64).

In *De Oratore,* Cicero gave an account of the philosophical and rhetorical schools, as he knew them:

> And in the first place from Plato himself sprang Aristotle and Xenophon, on one of whom was bestowed the name of the Peripatetic School and on the other that of the Academy; and next from Antisthenes, who in the Socratic discourse had been captivated chiefly by the ideal of endurance and hardness, came first the Cynics and next the Stoics; and then the Aristippus, who had taken delight rather in the Socratic discussions on the subject of pleasure, was derived the Cyrenaic philosophy, which Aristippus and his successors maintained without modification, whereas the contemporary thinkers make pleasure the sole standard of value, in doing so with great modesty neither satisfy the claims of virtue, which they do not despise, nor successfully have also been other groups of philosophers who almost all professed to be followers of Socrates, the Eretrians, the pupils of Erillus, the Megareans, the school of Pyrrho, but these have long ago been routed out of existence by the forceful arguments of the aforesaid schools. (Cicero, *De Oratore* 3.62)

It is clear from this excerpt that Cicero was familiar with all of the Hellenistic schools. Cicero considered himself to be an Academic, for in *The Nature of the Gods*, he says, "We Academics are not the type of philosophers who think that nothing is true" (1.12). And it is primarily through his writings (particularly the *Academics*) that we know of their teachings (Kennedy, *New* 93). During the late second century, rhetoric was looked down upon by all of the schools, probably because of the disappearance of Aristotle's *On Rhetoric* and the primacy of Plato's *Gorgias*. Cicero can be credited with much of the resurgence in the interest in rhetoric.

During Cicero's time, the Academy had split in two--there was the New Academy and the Old Academy. The New Academy believed that there is no infallible criterion of truth, thus they tended to challenge other philosophical schools. Although both schools considered themselves the proper followers of Plato, both were somewhat unfaithful. The Old Academy

rejected the skepticism of the New Academy, seeking instead to revive the Platonic doctrine of ideas as a basis for discovering truth. According to Colish, "Antiochus argued that Peripatetic, Epicurean, and Stoic schools were all basically in agreement with each other and with Platonism. He believed that the debates among these schools were merely debates over terminology and not over real doctrinal substance" (Colish 1:70). Most scholars consider Cicero to adhere more to the New Academy, one line of reasoning being that he was a rhetorician and so he "was accustomed to a mode of argument that traded in probabilities rather than certainties. Thus, the idea that probabilities afforded sufficient grounds for action squared with his professional and literary presuppositions" (Colish 1:71).

Kenneth Burke, in *A Rhetoric of Motives*, and in a section entitled "Rhetorical Motive", observes that:

> When making his claims for the universality of rhetoric (in the first book of the De Oratore) Cicero begins at a somewhat mythic stage when right acting and right speaking were considered one (he cites Homer on the training of Achilles). Next he notes regretfully the sharp dissociating of action and speech whereby the Sophists would eventually confine rhetoric to the verbal in a sheerly ornamental sense. And following this, he notes further detractions from the dignity of rhetoric caused by the dissociating of rhetoric and philosophy. (59)

In Cicero's words:

> Socrates robbed them of this general designation, and in his discussions separated the science of wise thinking from that of elegant speaking, though in reality they are closely linked together; and the genius and varied discourses of Socrates have been immortally enshrined in the compositions of Plato, Socrates not having left a single scrap of writing. This is the source from which has sprung the undoubtedly absurd and unprofitable and reprehensible severance between the tongue and the brain, leading to our having one set of professors to teach us to think and another to teach us to speak.
>
> (*De Oratore*, 3.60)

Although Cicero claims to be an Academic, it seems he has trouble with the school. He does not follow the destructive separation of Socrates, and even Plato, but seems more at home with an Aristotelian perspective. Like Aristotle, Cicero would like to see the rift healed between philosophy and rhetoric. Colish suggests, "Cicero stands squarely within the anti-sophistic tradition stretching back to the time of Plato. He borrows certain themes from the Stoics; but his rhetorical theory and the criteria he advocates for its practice reflects his adherence to the Peripatetic tradition" (1:78). Cicero is anti-Sophistic but not anti-eloquence. Speaking of Isocrates and Aristotle, Cicero relates two families of teachers, one portraying only speech, the other philosophy and rhetoric (Cicero, *De Inventione* 2.8). He says in *De Oratore* that it was one of his great missions to unify these families. Cicero seemed to adopt the Peripatetic view of rhetoric, such as that espoused by the Later Peripatetic, Ariston, "A science of seeing and pleading in civil questions by means of speech of popular persuasion" (Kennedy, *New* 88).

We know that Cicero would have had the writings of the Later Peripatetics, even the writings of Aristotle's successor Theophrastus, but we don't know if there were copies of Aristotle's *On Rhetoric* available (Wisse 106). *On Rhetoric* seems to have vanished at this time as it was not one of Aristotle's formally published works. Thus, it is likely that most knowledge of its concepts would have come through his followers such as Theophrastus. In looking at *De Oratore* it is possible that what did survive was somehow inaccurate or contaminated (Wisse 109-110). Jakob Wisse in his book *Ethos and Pathos from Aristotle to Cicero* seems to think that Cicero did, indeed, have direct reference to Aristotle's *On Rhetoric* (Wisse 189). It is possible that the differences between the two rhetorics has to do with an inaccurate positioning by other, more popular, writers of the day. One of the main indicators that Cicero did have access to *On Rhetoric,* stems from his reliance on ethos and pathos. These *pisteis* had dropped out of use after Theophrastus, and it is likely Cicero developed his slightly different approach from Aristotle's original, yet with influence from those scholars that had tended to ignore them (Wisse 82).

Although there is strong evidence that Cicero adhered to the Peripatetic school of rhetoric, there was a more exotic, Asiatic streak to his eloquent speaking. His earliest surviving speech, given at the age of twenty-five, tends towards Asianism. Kennedy describes Cicero's Asiatic style as having lengthy sentences "because of amplification of both ideas and language, including listings and doublings of words. In this early work the result at times seems cumbersome; he gradually developed more smoothness and suppleness, even in highly complex sentences. It also relies heavily on ethos anticipating techniques Cicero would later use to great effect" (*New* 129). Yet, as with many things, Cicero openly condemned this overly ornate style as "fat and greasy." In later life he claims to have, in Kennedy's words, learned "how to control his own youthful impetuosity, reduce his tendency to redundancy, and generally discipline himself to become the great orator he was destined to be" (*New* 96).

Colish concludes that Cicero's focus on rhetorical style, led to conflict with the Peripatetics as well as with the Stoics:

> [H]is elevation of rhetoric above logic can be seen as a criticism of the Aristotelian proclivities as a rhetorical theorist. At the same time, his elevation of rhetoric above logic can be seen as a criticism of the Aristotelian no less than the Stoic tradition. . . . He wishes to stress the principle that truth and goodness, important as they are, will remain inaccessible to most people unless they are made appealing by the art of rhetoric. (1:83)

Cicero concludes of the Stoic handbook on rhetoric, "but of such a sort that it is the one book to read if anyone should wish to keep quiet . . . .They point the argument with their puny little syllogisms like thorns. People may assent, but they are not convinced in their hearts and go away much as they came" (Kennedy, *New* 90).

Cicero seems to outwardly have found the Stoic doctrine to be useless:

> [I]t was Diogenes who claimed to be teaching an art of speaking well, and of distinguishing truth from error, which art he called by the Greek name of dialectic. This art, if indeed it be an art, contains no directions for discovering truth, but only for testing it. For as to every proposition that we enunciate with an affirmation of its truth or falsity, if it

> be affirmation of its truth or falsity, if it be affirmed without qualification, the dialectitians undertake to decide whether it be true or false; and, if again it be stated hypothetically, with collateral propositions annexed, then they decide whether these others are properly annexed, and whether the conclusion drawn form each and every reasoning is correct: and in the end they prick themselves with their own barbs, and by wide investigation discover not only the difficulties such as they themselves can no longer solve, but also others by which webs already attacked, or rather well-nigh unwound, are tangled up again. (Cicero, *De Oratore* 2.157)

Concerning style, "Cicero by no means subscribes to the Stoic conception of the sage as the only truly good orator; nor does he support the Stoic stylistic norms of brevity, restraint, minimal decoration and the exclusive appeal to the intellect of the audience" (Colish 1:80). In Cicero's study of Aristotle he basically attributes the Stoics' rather elaborate hypothetical syllogisms to Aristotle (Colish 1:84).

Examining all of Cicero's condemnations of the Stoic's one would be led to believe that if there was a school of which Cicero was definitely not a part, it would be Stoicism, yet that is far from the truth. The Stoic school has probably garnered more Ciceronian scholarship than any other. It can easily be seen from the above text that Cicero did not appreciate the Stoic style, yet he did appreciate their logical approach, at least to a point. The Stoics are known to have been a major influence on rhetoric, especially in grammar (Aristotle 231). They developed the theory of grammatical analogy and anomaly, as well as developing the use of the trope and metaphor. Kennedy states, "[Grammar] was in Aristotle's time still a relatively undeveloped field of study. Systematic grammars of the Greek language did not appear until the second century B.C., when they reflect the research of Stoic philosophers" (91).

In a sort of backhanded compliment to their virtue, and a challenge to the Stoic sage, Cicero proclaims:

> Moreover, the Stoics, of whom I by no means disapprove, I nevertheless dismiss--and I do not fear their anger, because anger is quite unknown to them, and I am grateful to them for

> being the only one of all the schools that has pronounced eloquence to be a virtue and a form of wisdom. But clearly there is something in them that is quite out of keeping with the orator whom we are depicting: in the first place their assertion that all those who are not wise are slaves, brigands, enemies, madmen, and hat all the same nobody is wise--yet it would be the height of folly to place a public meeting or the Senate or any assembly of people under the direction of a person who holds the view that not one of those present is sane, or a citizen, or a free man. There is the further point that even the style of their discourse, though possibly subtle and undoubtedly penetrating, yet for an orator is bald, unfamiliar, jarring on the ear of the public, devoid of clarity, fullness and spirit, while at the same time of a character that makes it quite impossible to employ it in public speaking. . . . (Cicero, *De Oratore* 3.65)

Likewise Seneca the Stoic writer eschewed crowds and was rather hostile to rhetoricians, still, he tended to use rhetoric to its fullest (Seneca 172). "Seneca has used every rhetorical device the Greek and Roman theorists have elaborated," says Hadas (Seneca, 17). His typical usage was that of the pointed style-clear, concise, yet elegant. "But though Stoicism equipped itself with a logic and cosmology, like rival schools, the impelling motive out of which it was originated and perpetuated through several centuries was not so much philosophical but evangelical" (Seneca 19). Much like the Patristics, and Cicero, they tended to denounce rhetoric but used it to their advantage.

On a similar note, another seeming inconsistency was the Stoic attachment to civic duty, yet the refusal to participate actively in politics (Hicks 140). Their hesitancy, Cicero thought, was against their own convictions of nature. Since man is a social creature, and can solve many problems by discussion, he should do so. Posidonius was the chief philosopher through whom Cicero gained his knowledge of the Stoic system (Cicero, *Nature* xxxiii). Yet, it was Panaetius of Rhodes, a Stoic philosopher who admired Plato and Aristotle, who influenced Cicero's thought the most. He wrote *On Duties* , around which Cicero structured his own book by the same name (Kennedy, *New* 92).

Cicero's main thrust was ethical, and it is here that he strongly connects with the Stoics (Colish 1:126). Cicero develops a theory utilizing the Stoic tradition where ethical needs can be met while still valuing the Peripatetics over the Stoics since they focus both on ethics and rhetoric (144). Cicero sets down some of his basic beliefs as follows:

> The law of nature is that which is not born of opinion, but implanted in us by a kind of innate instinct: it includes religion, duty, gratitude, revenge, reverence and truth. Religion is that which brings men to serve and worship a higher order of nature which they call divine. Duty is the feeling which renders kind offices and loving service to one's kin and country. . . . Truth is the quality by which events in the past, present or future are referred to without alteration of material fact. (Cicero, *De Inventione* 2.161)

"For Cicero, as for the Stoics, the orator's aim is to instruct his hearers in the good and he must be a virtuous man himself, who communicates the ethical values he professes by his personal example. Cicero links the morality of the speaker with a specific set of political attitudes" (Colish 1:80). Cicero tended, as most Romans, to think like a Stoic (Noss 60). He never committed to any one camp and often chided the Stoics. His personal philosophy, however, tended toward the Stoic camp. He was not hesitant to use the Greek philosophies against his defendants, whom he equally accused of being Stoic and Epicurean, whenever it suited his needs (Kennedy, *New* 140). This tactic worked because although Greek thought was a large part of Roman culture it was still treated as foreign and suspect. Reflectively, Coltish posits:

> In some areas of his thought he is highly enthusiastic about Stoicism and draws on it heavily. In other areas he attacks Stoic principles forcefully. In still other areas he expressly reformulates them. In yet other areas he manifests only a low level of interest in Stoic ideas and mingles them indiscriminately with doctrines drawn from other schools. Sometimes he presents the Stoic ideas at his command accurately, straightforwardly, and in their full strength. Sometimes he does not. This too is a function not of intellectual sloppiness so much as of the particular branch of philosophy with which he is concerned. (1:78)

Almost in opposition to the Stoics, arose the school of Epicureanism. It would be rather difficult to accuse Cicero of affiliation with the Epicureans. Practically the only shared philosophical groundings they have are a exaltation of friendship, and courting of the wealthy. Based on an account by Greek biographer Diogenes Laertius:

> Epicurus was not only misrepresented by also slandered by his enemies. He was regarded as one of the "most shameless of the physicists," a "foul-mouthed bastard," a flatterer of persons in important positions, a plagiarizer of the doctrines of Democritus about atoms and of Aristippus about pleasure, a teacher of effeminacy, a lewd letter writer, and a nasty name-caller.
>
> (Panichas 17)

Cicero was chief among those slandering Epicurus:

> In his attacks Cicero irreparably damage the reputation and the fate of Epicureanism. Preparing the way for the eventual silencing of Epicurean adherents after the third century, he provided the vocabulary of vituperation for their opponents. he incorporated in his writings the misrepresentation that ultimately became a permanent part of the history of Epicureanism. For many, many centuries after Cicero, Epicureanism was equated with unbridled hedonism; and Cicero's writings were often the source of this attitude.
>
> (Panichas 130)

Epicurus proclaimed that "We must release ourselves from the prison of affairs and politics"(Epicurus 115). Cicero was not of this mind. He stood for his beliefs until the very end sacrificing himself for what he thought was right.

Cicero's *Phillipics* are considered rhetorical masterworks, yet it was because of the power of these writings that an outraged Mark Antony called for his murder. The murder was carried out, and Cicero's dismembered head and hands were placed on the Rostra as a symbol mocking Cicero's powerful rhetoric (Enos 35). Indeed, Cicero had fought the good fight, but he had, in the end, lost to the power of the Ceasers. After considering all of the eclectic elements in Cicero's rhetoric, Colish asserts that we are left with three possible ways to view Cicero, and his

rhetoric. First, is that it is exemplary of Hellenistic philosophy, "Marked by eclecticism and the tendency to blur the distinctive positions of earlier Greek schools." Second, Cicero was a "rhetorician, sensitive to the principle that different kinds of arguments should be advanced in different works depending on the objective at issue. Thus, he sometimes advocates one position and at other times another; his discrepancies, reversals and omissions are a calculated rhetorical strategy." Or, thirdly, that his rhetoric was not confused or inaccurate but rather selective. He wasn't interested in a "consistent philosophical system but sought rather to find solutions to a number of particular problems" (1:68). The eloquent introduction to *De Oratore* captures Cicero at his most profound and conflicted, "Wisdom without eloquence has been of little help to states, but eloquence without wisdom has often been a great obstacle and never an advantage" (1.1).

This analysis clearly establishes that Cicero's rhetoric is, indeed, beyond classification in any orthodox sense--it is, at best, Ciceronian. Although some rhetors are more easily categorized than others, most, I believe, would prove as resistant as Cicero. Cicero's method is one of eclecticism, of picking and choosing what works--it is functional. Although many have tried to divine the origins of Cicero's rhetorical methods, still, it is apparent that it does not easily fit into any one system, nor is any system safe from pillaging. It is also worth noting that the method I have employed throughout this essay has, itself, been guilty of the same need for categorization that it works against. In an attempt to liberate Cicero from false categories, I have shackled many other rhetors and philosophers to strict categorization. I think, however, this was a disservice necessary to the process of proving my thesis. My intent has not been to do away with all attempts to categorize--it is impossible to make sense of any history without some schema. It has been, through the example of Cicero, to show that any philosophy, and particularly any rhetoric by its nature, is resistant to tidy labeling and categorization. That rhetoric has been, and continues to be, a field that incorporates thoughts from all other fields, and diverse traditions. For me, at least, that's what makes the field so exciting.

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Frontispiece graphic of Egyptian literary papyri of Cicero's Catilinam 1, 13-15 (circa 30 B.C.) Online. Available: http://library.duke.edu/rubenstein/scriptorium/papyrus/images/150dpi/798r-at150.gif